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NOTES
LEGISLATING BUSINESS MORALITY: A LOOK
AT EFFORTS BY TWO INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO DEAL WITH
QUESTIONABLE BEHAVIOR BY
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The news media have been filled in recent years with stories of
questionable conduct by transnational corporations (TNCs). Allegations and admissions of bribes and "dubious" payments or
"improper" benefits to governmental and political figures and
groups have been rife. In response, numerous national bodies have
set about the task of investigating and dealing with questionable
TNC conduct. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the State Department,
the Defense Department, the Justice Department, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, the Congress, and the Executive
have been active on the problem.
Various international bodies have also investigated and taken
steps to deal with questionable TNC conduct. This note focuses on
the progress made in this area by two international organizations,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the Organization of American States (OAS). The
former recently produced a code of conduct for TNCs; the latter is
in the process of producing such a code. By examining the approaches undertaken by these two organizations and noting some
deficiencies, criticisms, and suggestions, the author has concluded
that, although little progress on creating a workable system of
international norms has as yet been made, the efforts of the OECD
and the OAS represent a significant first step.
I1.

THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT

A.

Recent Developments

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
was created after the Second World War as an agency through
which the nations of Western Europe could rebuild their economies
with the help of financial and economic assistance from the United
States. In 1961 the OEEC was reconstituted as the Organization
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).' The purpose of the convention establishing the OECD was to promote
policies designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries. .. 3
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well
as non-member countries in the process of economic development;
and
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral,
non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.'

Although the scope of its concerns has expanded to include such
matters as raw materials and commodities, fair trade, energy, and
environmental problems, the OECD remains primarily devoted to
the resolution of difficulties involving international economic relations.
In 1974, in furtherance of OECD objectives and in response to
recent developments, various committees and ad hoc working
groups at the OECD began considering guidelines for governmental policies and standards of behavior for TNCs. The work was
consolidated and given momentum in January 1975, when the
OECD established a Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises.4 After more than a year of drafting and
negotiations, the Committee produced a code of conduct 5 which
was formally adopted by the OECD Council at a ministerial meeting in June 1976.6
1. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, done Dec. 14, 1960, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
2. Id. at 1732, T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
3. Member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
4. Resolution of the Council Establishing a Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, adopted Jan. 21, 1975, OECD Doc.
C(74) 247.
5. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
adopted June 21, 1976, Annex and Decisions of Council, OECD Doc. 21 (76) 04/1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on International Investment], 75 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 83 (1976), 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 967 (1976). See generally COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) No. 295 (July 1, 1976).
6. OECD Doc. PRESS/A (76)20 (1976).
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B.

Code Provisions

The OECD code consists of a Declaration to which are annexed
"Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" and three Decisions of
the OECD Council. The Guidelines are divided into a preamble
and sections on general policies, disclosure of information, competition, financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations,
and science and technology. The Guidelines section on general
policies is the only portion of the code dealing with questionable
payments. It states that TNCs should:
(7) not render-and they should not be solicited or expected to
render-any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to
any public servant or holder of public office;
(8) unless legally permissible, not make contributions to candidates for public office or to political parties or other political organizations;
(9) abstain from any improper involvement in local political activities.,
C. Analysis
The OECD code represents the first time that the predominantly Western industrialized nations, acting in concert, have expressed an opinion about corporate behavior. According to Paul H.
Boeker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development and head of the United States government negotiating team, the OECD "adopted a comprehensive set
of policy commitments which attempt to define for the first time
a stable environment for investment flows among the industrial
countries, based on a codification of mutual responsibilities of gov'8
ernments and private enterprise."

While the language of the code embodies high principles, its
effectiveness is quite another matter. The Declaration states that
the governments of the OECD member countries "jointly recommend to iultinational enterprises operating in their territories the
observance of the Guidelines .

. . ."

The Guidelines "lay down

7.

Declaration on International Investment, supra note 5, at 14, 75 DEP'T
at 85, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 972.
8. Boeker, InternationalGuidelines for MultinationalEnterprises,in PRIVATE

STATE BULL.

INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS

AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESs

75

(1976).
9. Declaration on International Investment, supra note 5, at 7, 75 DEP'T STATE
BULL. at 83, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 968.
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standards for the activities of [TNCs] in the different Member
countries.""' However, the Guidelines themselves state that:
[o]bservance of the guidelines is voluntary and not legally enforceable...
(7) Every State has the right to prescribe the conditions under
which multinational enterprises operate within its national jurisdiction, subject to international law and to the international agreements to which it has subscribed. The entities of a multinational
enterprise located in various countries are subject to the laws of
these countries.
(11) Member countries have agreed to establish appropriate review and consultation procedures concerning issues arising in respect of the guidelines . . .

The review and consultation procedures are qualified by one of the
three Decisions of the OECD Council. This states that the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
shall periodically exchange views on matters related to the Guidelines," but that the Committee "shall not reach conclusions on the
conduct of individual enterprises."' 3
In addition to being merely "recommendations" whose observance is "voluntary and not legally enforceable," the subsections on
bribery also contain a few loopholes. Contributions by TNCs to
candidates for public office or to political parties or to other political organizations are allowed unless the host country outlaws
them. The TNC is thus not enjoined from making such contributions; rather, the burden is placed on the host country to take the
affirmative step of banning a source of political funds. Furthermore, defining the extent of the ban poses grave difficulties. TNC
political contributions are not universally considered to be bribes,
or even acknowledged as questionable. The cynic would maintain
that a government benefiting from TNC contributions would be
unlikely to ban them.
This situation is further complicated by the existence of code
provisions on national treatment of TNCs. The Declaration states
that:
10.
11.
71.
12.
13.

Id. at 12, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 84, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 970.
Id. at 12-13, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 84-85, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 970-

O

Id. at 19, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 87, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 977.
Id., 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 87, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 978.
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Member countries should . . .accord to enterprises operating in
their territories and owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
nationals of another Member country .
treatment under their
laws, regulations and administrative practices, consistent with international law and no less favorable than that accorded in like
situations to domestic enterprises . ...
Moreover, the preamble to the Guidelines states that: "the guidelines are not aimed at introducing differences of treatment between multinational and domestic enterprises; wherever relevant
they reflect good practice for all. Accordingly, multinational and
domestic enterprises are subject to the same expectations in respect of their conduct wherever the guidelines are relevant to
both." For the sake of liberal trade and consistent application of
the code, these provisions suggest that a ban on TNC political
contributions should be paralleled by a ban on political contributions by domestic corporations. The possibility of such a ban appears remote since politicians are unlikely to forego the support of
domestic corporations where such participation is traditional, nor
are they likely to expose their country's multinationals to the risks
of retaliation that might arise from a ban on TNC contributions.
The first anti-corruption provision in the general policies section
of the Guidelines is a prohibition of direct or indirect bribes or
other improper benefits to public servants or holders of public
office."6 However, the strength of this provision is vitiated by the
operation of the following provision allowing political contributions where legally permissible. Sanctioned political contributions
often obtain the same or similar results as bribes or other improper
benefits. Thus, the provision allowing political contributions severely restricts the scope of the provision directly addressing the
bribery issue.
Under the third anti-corruption provision in the general policies
section of the Guidelines,"7 involvement in local political activities
is permitted unless such involvement can be characterized as
"improper." This rather vague standard does not define, nor create
a mechanism for determining, what is "improper." Such pious and
general language will not significantly constrain corporate decision
makers, especially those who have in the past knowingly engaged
in presumably corrupt and "improper" activities.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 7, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 83, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 968.
Id. at 12-13, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 85, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 971.
Id. at 14, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 85, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 972.

Id.
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In summary, the anti-corruption provisions of the OECD code
seem to have little effectiveness. Not only is the code unenforceable as international law, but the provisions on corruption contain
loopholes that weaken their impact. It should also be noted that
the code is designed to apply to TNC conduct only within the
OECD Member states;'8 TNCs are free to pursue "improper" activities in the Third World.
These deficiencies are attributable to several factors. First, the
OECD operates on a principle of unanimity. The OECD convention provides that "decisions shall be taken and recommendations
shall be made by mutual agreement of all the Members."' 9 If
a Member abstains from voting, the decision or recommendation
shall not be invalidated, but shall apply only to the voting Members.2 The effect of this procedural rule is to encourage consensus
positions rather than dramatic policy initiatives.
In addition, the OECD outlook favors TNCs and free trade. The
OECD as an essentially homogeneous body composed entirely of
industrialized nations" tends to emphasize the benefits which
TNCs can confer on world trade and production. As stated in the
Guidelines:
The common aim of the Member countries is to encourage the positive contributions which multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress and to minimize and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise ....
The guidelines . . . are designed to assist in the achievement of this common
aim and to contribute to improving the foreign investment climate.2
This philosophy is at odds with that of the Third World, which
perceives the TNC as adversely dominating and exploiting developing economies. Obviously, the OECD attempt at regulating
TNC conduct is unlikely to arouse much enthusiasm or admiration
in the Third World.
The United States played an ambiguous role in the creation of
the OECD code. The predominant American concern has been
with safeguarding a liberal climate for international direct invest18.
19.
ment,
20.
at the
21.

22.
STATE

Id. at 12, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 84, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 970.

Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developsupra note 1, 12 U.S.T. at 1734, T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
Id. at 1734, T.I.A.S. No. 4891. Turkey abstained from approving the code
June 1976 Council meeting.
See note 3 supra.

Declaration on International Investment, supra note 5, at 11, 75
BULL. at 84, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 969.
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ment. The United States believes that this climate is being eroded
by significant economic and political pressures, fed in part by the
revelations of questionable activities by American TNCs. The
mounting pressures for TNC regulation threaten the benefits the
United States derives from its extensive foreign investment.3
This climate caused the United States to be an early advocate
of an international code for TNCs.2 4 American policy, however, has
been a mixture of restraint and activism. In most areas, the United
States has sought to forestall extensive regulation of TNCs and has
worked to encourage compromise of conflicting national treatments within the fundamental context of the free trade concept.
Yet, it has also strongly endorsed strict measures to eliminate corporate corruption, perceiving corrupt practices as a burden on international trade and investment.2 5 Undoubtedly, an additional,
unarticulated consideration is that the corrupt practices of American TNCs may be contrary to American law, whereas the corrupt
practices of non-American TNCs may not be contrary to their
national law. In the absence of international standards on corruption, then, American TNCs would operate at a competitive disadvantage.
In the OECD, therefore
the U.S. objective from the beginning has been to set up a voluntary
compact between governments articulating reasonable standards of
business practice and enterprises indicating on their own that these
are standards they do apply and want to apply in the future.
The U.S. Government ...

has supported development of OECD

guidelines for multinational firms in an effort to sustain an international environment for these firms conducive to their making their
26
full contribution to economic growth in the industrial countries.
23. Boeker, supra note 8, at 76-78; Boeker, A Code for Multinationals, Wall
St. J., May 28, 1976, at 8, col. 3.
24. See, e.g., Statement of Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Sec'y of State, before
the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Goverment of the Joint Economic
Comm., reprinted in 74 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 412 (1976); Address of Secretary of
State Kissinger read before the Seventh Special Sess. of the United Nations
General Assembly, reprintedin 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425, 432-33 (1975); Address
by Secretary of State Kissinger before the A.B.A., 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 353, 361
(1975); Address by Under Sec'y of State Charles W. Robinson, 73 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 886, 890-92 (1975).

25. Statement by Secretary Kissinger before the OECD Council, 75
73, 76 (1976).
26. Boeker, supra note 8, at 83, 85.

STATE BULL.

DEP'T
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The corrupt practices considerations mentioned above, coupled
with the fact that 70 percent of American overseas investment is
concentrated in the OECD Member countries, 2 led the United
States to become an early advocate of the code and to urge that it
include strong measures dealing with corporate corruption. The
disappointing result is not surprising, given that the OECD's institutional framework virtually rules out any aggressive stance on
controversial issues, and that the policy pursued by the United
States might at times have appeared contradictory.
How might the OECD code be improved? One commentator has
suggested that the OECD prohibit payments to foreign government officials in excess of a designated threshold amount; that
agents' fees be limited to a maximum percentage set on a sliding
scale in which the percentage of the commission decreases as the
size of the contract increases; and that countries give their regulatory agencies investigative authority sufficient to insure that the
full details of a questionable transaction will be obtained. In addition, Member states should also be required to undertake investigations of corporate activity at the request of another Member
state, and should share with the requesting state the information
collected. Enforcement would be through court proceedings.28
While these suggestions have merit, it is unlikely that the OECD
will be able to agree on any of them in the near future. A simpler
and easier alternative would be an increased emphasis on disclosure. The OECD could require that all corporate payments or contributions be listed in the annual report or be placed in the public
record in some other fashion in both the home and the host countries. Fear of adverse public reaction at home and/or abroad would
thus serve as a device to curtail the most questionable of the payments and practices.
In summary, one might conclude that the OECD provisions on
corporate corruption as they presently stand will have little discernable effect on the conduct of international business. They are
desirable, however, as an articulation of norms from which future
development can occur either within the OECD or in other forums.
27.
28.

Id. at 85.
Note, The Regulation of Questionable Foreign Payments, 8 LAW & POL.

INT'L Bus.

1055, 1077-78 (1976).
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III.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

A.

Recent Developments

The Organization of American States (OAS) began to devote
serious attention to the emerging problem of TNC regulation in
1974 when the fourth regular session of the General Assembly of
2
the OAS approved Resolution 167 on transnational enterprises. 1
By Resolution 167, the General Assembly sought to marshal all
available information in order to better understand the nature of
the TNC phenomenon and, if necessary, plan a response. In condensed form, the General Assembly resolved: (1) to obtain a compilation of studies on the nature and legal structure of TNCs, their
economic and operational characteristics, and the impact of their
activities on the development of Latin American countries; (2) to
make any additional studies considered necessary; and (3) to coordinate this work and bring it to the attention of the Member States
along with pertinent observations and comments as soon as possible .31

In accordance with Resolution 167 and a request by the Permanent Council thereunder,3' the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the principal juridical organ of the OAS, began examining the
subject of TNCs in the Fall of 1974.32 At its regular session in Rio
de Janeiro from February 20 to March 14, 1975, the Committee
gave priority consideration to the topic of TNCs and received papers prepared by members. 3 The Committee summarized these
studies in its report to the fifth regular session of the General
Assembly in May 1975, but refrained from making any recommen34
dations at that time.

At its meeting in July 1975, the Permanent Council unanimously
approved Resolution 154 on the behavior of TNCs and the need for
a code of conduct.3 5 In this resolution, the Council noted "[t]hat
news stories have recently come to public light concerning actions
constituting manifestly immoral conduct, as well as interference
29. OAS AG/RES. 167 (IV-0/74) OEA/Ser. P/IV. 0.2 (1974).
30. Id.
31. OAS CP/doc. 348/74 rev. 1 (1974).
32. Zanotti, Regional andInternationalActivities, 7 LAw. AM. 124, 126 (1975).
33. Id. at 385, 396 (1975). For abstracts of the papers, see id. at 686, 695-97
(1975).
34. OAS AG/doc. 512, at 49-59 (1975).
35. Behavior of TransnationalEnterprisesOperatingin the Region and Need
for a Code of Conduct to be Observed by Such Enterprises, OAS CP/RES. No.
154 (167/75) corr. 1 (July 10, 1975), 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1326-28, 1603 (1975).
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on the part of some transnational enterprises in the domestic affairs of some countries of the hemisphere."3 The Council stated
that:
[Sluch illegal activities have an adverse effect on the political and
economic relations between member states and create an atmosphere prejudicial to social peace, to the public security of such
states, and to legitimate trade and investment activities that are
important to their development.

.

.

it is necessary for the member

states to find definite and effective means of preventing such illegal
activities."
Accordingly, in the operative part of Resolution 154 the Permanent Council resolved:
(1) To request the member states to cooperate in the exchange of
information for the purpose of achieving effective control of the
activities of transnational enterprises, so that such enterprises conform to the economic and social goals of the host state.
(2) To make a study of the principles that should govern the activities of transnational enterprises for the purpose of preparing a draft
code of conduct which such enterprises should observe. In the preparation of this code, account will be taken of the work being carried
out in this regard within the sphere of the United Nations ....
(3)

To present a report in order that.

. .

the matter may be placed

on the agenda and submitted to the sixth regular session of the
General Assembly. ....
In a separate section, the Permanent Council also resolved:
(I) To condemn in the most emphatic terms any act of bribery,
illegal payment or offer of payment by any transnational enterprise;
any demand for or acceptance of improper payments as well as any
act contrary to ethics and legal procedures; and
(II) To urge the governments of the member states, insofar as necessary, to clarify their national laws with regard to the aforementioned improper or illegal acts.39
While not a code of conduct, Resolution 154 offers some interesting comparisons with and contrasts to the OECD code. The anticorruption language of the separate section of Resolution 154 suffers from a vagueness similar to that of the OECD code-the language contains no guidance as to what is "improper" or "unethi36. Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1327.
37. Id.
38. Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1327-28, 1603.
39. Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1328, 1603.
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cal." Nevertheless, the OAS outlook is broad in that Resolution
154 placed equal blame both on those requesting or accepting improper payments or benefits and on the TNCs providing them.
Here again, however, the home countries are not required to police
the foreign activities of their TNCs.
Like the OECD code, voluntary measures are apparently envisioned. The resolution speaks in terms of preparing a code of conduct which TNCs should observe. The wording is significant, as an
earlier version of the Resolution had spoken in terms of preparing
a code of conduct which TNCs must observe. 0 The change undoubtedly reflects the consensual nature of OAS proceedings.
Both the OECD code" and the OAS resolution 2 recognize that
TNCs are subject to national jurisdiction. Both organizations recognize that the TNC can play a constructive role in society' 3 and
both seek to harmonize national responses."
All of these similarities lead one to conclude that any OAS code
along the lines of Resolution 154 would be confined to a voluntary,
non-binding statement of principle differing only slightly from the
OECD code. Such a conclusion ignores an additional element that
influences OAS proceedings. Most of the members of the OAS are
developing nations. This means that while there are superficial
similarities between the approaches embodied in Resolution 154
and the OECD code, the OAS approach in fact has a different
emphasis. The OAS approach is less solicitous of the well-being of
TNCs. Protectionism is not weakened in Resolution 154 by any
national treatment provisions comparable to those of the OECD
code. The OAS resolution urges clarification of national laws, not
equal treatment of domestic corporations and TNCs. Moreover,
the OAS Permanent Council states that:
the activities of transnational enterprises should contribute to
achievement of the goals of national policies of economic and social
development and of the natural resources of the countries (where
they operate) ... transnational enterprises ... should conform to
the development policy of those countries. 5
40. See 14 1NT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1328, 1603.
41.

See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

42. OAS CP/RES. No. 154, supra note 35, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1327.
43. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. See also OAS CPIRES. No. 154,
supra note 35, 14 1NT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1327.
44. See notes 14, 15, & 22 supra and accompanying text. See also OAS
CP/RES. No. 154, supra note 35, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1328.
45. OAS CP/RES. No. 154, supra note 35, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1327.
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As mild as this language really is, it is also a far cry from the
protective, quasi-laissez faire approach of the OECD code. Resolution 154 suggests that only through regulation may the TNC serve
as a vehicle for beneficial social development in the host country.
Finally, there is a reference to taking account of United Nations
activity in preparing an OAS code. 6 Given the voting strength and
outlook of the Group of 77, there exists the possibility of relatively
militant activity within the United Nations.
From January 12 to February 13, 1976, the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS held a regular meeting during which
it aproved a 130 page report entitled, An Opinion on Transnational
4" The Committee recommended the establishment of
Enterprises.
an Inter-American Center for Transnational Enterprises. Among
other things, the Center would collect data; analyze and evaluate
the contributions of TNCs to the development of OAS member
countries; advise the OAS in matters related to TNCs; examine
differences among the American states with regard to TNCs; study
ways to implement regional cooperation on the problems of TNCs;
and coordinate studies and activities with other regions and with
the United Nations. The Center could adapt worldwide applications to the regional level, and could make regional matters more
compatible with world matters. The Center would also ensure a
dynamic and timely treatment of TNCs. With particular reference
to the problem of TNC corruption, the member states of the OAS
could use the Center as a vehicle to study which cooperative measures would be most helpful in preventing and penalizing acts by
TNCs that interfere with the sovereignty of the states.
The OAS report ended with eight conclusions. Those especially
relevant to the problem of corporate corruption were as follows:
2. Transnational enterprises have responsibilities commensurate
with their economic and administrative power and in matters related to infractions or violations of juridical order. The joint and
several responsibilities of the enterprise should coincide with the
limited responsibility of the corporation through the convergence of
two elements, one generic, the existence of the enterprise, and the
other specific, the determining action of the parent company affecting the affiliate or of a subsidiary affecting another subsidiary.
3. Transnational enterprises are subject to sovereignty and therefore to the laws and decisions of judges and courts and of the coppetent authorities of the states in which they carry out their opera46.

Id., 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 1328. See text accompanying note 38 supra.

47.

OAS AG/doc. 651, add. 5 (1976).
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tions. They may not claim preference or privilege because of their
transnational nature or because of their involvement in foreign interests.
Transnational enterprises must conduct their activities in a manner consistent with government policy on investment, reinvestment,
credit, money, taxes, prices, marketing, industrial property, return
of invested capital, remittance of profits, and so forth. They are
obliged to provide information on their activities without hesitation,
reluctance or limitation.
They are absolutely prohibited from becoming involved in political affairs or interfering directly or indirectly with the sovereignty
of the states.
Each state may determine which penalties are applicable to
transnational enterprises if they violate juridical order.
In addition to such domestic juridical standards that the states
may consider necessary or advisable in this matter, they may agree
among themselves to prevent and repress excesses and abuses by
transnational enterprises.
6. International agreement is essential . . . . The states should
ensure cooperation and understanding among themselves on transnational enterprises as a priority objective, through the mechanisms
of the United Nations and the Organization of American States in
both the formulation of general rules and the examination and
settlement of disputes."
Both the OAS Resolution and the Committee's report represent
a stage of pre-code development. Similar to Resolution 154, the
report embodies certain fundamental assumptions not shared by
the OECD approach. For example, TNC involvement in political
affairs is absolutely forbidden. Again, the thrust is away from a
"liberal climate for international direct investment" and towards
a philosophy of adversarial regulation.
The Inter-American Juridical Committee's Opinion on Transnational Enterprises was submitted to the OAS General Assembly
during its sixth regular session in Santiago, Chile, from June 4 to
18, 1976. Also submitted was a report by the Permanent Council
on Resolution 154.11 The Council's report stressed the importance
of continued surveillance of TNCs by the OAS, with a view to
preparing a code of conduct meeting the requirements of Latin
American countries while also offering a basis for good inter50
American relations.
48. Id.
49. OAS AG/doc. 651/76 (1976).
50. Id.
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In response, the General Assembly passed Resolution 241, 5' requesting the Permanent Council to continue studying the TNC
problem, and to concentrate in particular on principles that would
serve as a basis for the preparation of a draft code of conduct.
Further, the Assembly requested the General Secretariat (under
whose aegis the Inter-American Juridical Committee functions)
to continue its comparative study of Latin American legislation
on the regulation and control of foreign private investment, with
special reference to the principles contained therein that might be
helpful in the preparation of a code of conduct. Finally, the Assembly requested the member states to cooperate in the exchange of
information in order to acquire a better knowledge of the economic,
social, and political effects of the operations and practices of
TNCs 2'
B.

Prognosis

The future of OAS code efforts is unclear. Considerable time has
elapsed without production of a code. However, it must be remembered that the subject of TNC regulation is legally, politically, and
economically complex. This complexity is magnified by the composition of the OAS, which on this issue pits the interests of the
United States against those of its southern neighbors. Under such
circumstances, especially where a code of greater specificity than
that produced by the OECD appears to be generally desired, progress on reaching an agreement is bound to take time. Furthermore,
the OAS is, to some extent, duplicating the efforts of the United
Nations in this field. 3 The members of the OAS may come to feel
that the process of defining a code is better undertaken by the
United Nations, which has greater resources at its disposal.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has dealt with efforts by two international organizations-the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Organization of American States-to formulate
51.

OAS AG/RES. No. 241 (VI-0/76) (1976), OAS General Secretariat,

TransnationalEnterprises, 11 OAS CHRON. 33 (July 1976).
52. Id.
53. See generally Rubin, Harmonizationof Rules: A Perspective on the U.N.
Commission on TransnationalCorporations,8 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 875 (1976);
Rubin, Developments in the Law and Institutions of International Economic
Relations: Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations,70 AM. J. INT'L LAW 73 (1976).
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standards of business conduct addressed to the problem of TNC
corporate corruption. The OECD has produced a code; the GAS is
in the process of formulating one.
The OECD code, containing what seems to be strong language
condemning corrupt practices by TNCs, consists of recommendations whose observance is voluntary. As it presently stands, therefore, the OECD code is unlikely to lead to a transformation of
corporate ethics. Amending the code to provide for greater disclosure might prove beneficial, however.
It is unclear whether the OAS will ever successfully produce a
code. More diverse interests operate within the OAS than within
the OECD, and these may prevent agreement on standards of
conduct. Nevertheless, the steps taken thus far indicate that an
OAS code would be less accommodating to the TNC and more
specific in nature. An important element in the GAS approach not
present in the OECD code is the concept that the TNC should
consciously serve national development policy.
Because of their voluntary nature, the OECD and OAS initiatives by themselves will probably not result in radical transformations of business practice. They will, however, carry significant
political and moral weight, and thus may exercise some influence
on corporate conduct. Without question, an articulation of standards for TNCs is desirable. In an increasingly integrated world,
consistency and predictability of treatment and activity is important for TNCs and fof home and host countries. The initiatives
taken by these organizations help in the effort to resolve uncertainty in the international business community. They serve as
expressions of differing concepts of regulation, and are part of a
dialogue among nations, international organizations, and institutions. When taken in combination with the activities of the United
Nations and its relevant agencies, the International Labor Organization, the International Chamber of Commerce, and other bodies,
they represent a movement toward the creation of an international
set of norms that may yet come to have the force of law.
James Scott Glascock

